16 research outputs found
New Assumptions and Efficient Cryptosystems from the -th Power Residue Symbol
The -th power residue symbol is a useful mathematical tool in cryptography, where is an integer, is a prime ideal in the prime factorization of with a large prime satisfying , and is an -th primitive root of unity. One famous case of the -th power symbol is the first semantic secure public key cryptosystem due to Goldwasser and Micali (at STOC 1982). In this paper, we revisit the -th power residue symbol and its applications. In particular, we prove that computing the -th power residue symbol is equivalent to solving the discrete logarithm problem. By this result, we give a natural extension of the Goldwasser-Micali cryptosystem, where is an integer only containing small prime factors. Compared to another extension of the Goldwasser-Micali cryptosystem due to Joye and Libert (at EUROCRYPT 2013), our proposal is more efficient in terms of bandwidth utilization and decryption cost. With a new complexity assumption naturally extended from the one used in the Goldwasser-Micali cryptosystem, our proposal is provable IND-CPA secure. Furthermore, we show that our results on the -th power residue symbol can also be used to construct lossy trapdoor functions and circular and leakage resilient public key encryptions with more efficiency and better bandwidth utilization
Secure and scalable deduplication of horizontally partitioned health data for privacy-preserving distributed statistical computation
Background
Techniques have been developed to compute statistics on distributed datasets without revealing private information except the statistical results. However, duplicate records in a distributed dataset may lead to incorrect statistical results. Therefore, to increase the accuracy of the statistical analysis of a distributed dataset, secure deduplication is an important preprocessing step.
Methods
We designed a secure protocol for the deduplication of horizontally partitioned datasets with deterministic record linkage algorithms. We provided a formal security analysis of the protocol in the presence of semi-honest adversaries. The protocol was implemented and deployed across three microbiology laboratories located in Norway, and we ran experiments on the datasets in which the number of records for each laboratory varied. Experiments were also performed on simulated microbiology datasets and data custodians connected through a local area network.
Results
The security analysis demonstrated that the protocol protects the privacy of individuals and data custodians under a semi-honest adversarial model. More precisely, the protocol remains secure with the collusion of up to N − 2 corrupt data custodians. The total runtime for the protocol scales linearly with the addition of data custodians and records. One million simulated records distributed across 20 data custodians were deduplicated within 45 s. The experimental results showed that the protocol is more efficient and scalable than previous protocols for the same problem.
Conclusions
The proposed deduplication protocol is efficient and scalable for practical uses while protecting the privacy of patients and data custodians
Tight Reductions for Diffie-Hellman Variants in the Algebraic Group Model
Fuchsbauer, Kiltz, and Loss~(Crypto\u2718) gave a simple and clean definition of an ¥emph{algebraic group model~(AGM)} that lies in between the standard model and the generic group model~(GGM). Specifically, an algebraic adversary is able to exploit group-specific structures as the standard model while the AGM successfully provides meaningful hardness results as the GGM. As an application of the AGM, they show a tight computational equivalence between the computing Diffie-Hellman~(CDH) assumption and the discrete logarithm~(DL) assumption. For the purpose, they used the square Diffie-Hellman assumption as a bridge, i.e., they first proved the equivalence between the DL assumption and the square Diffie-Hellman assumption, then used the known equivalence between the square Diffie-Hellman assumption and the CDH assumption. In this paper, we provide an alternative proof that directly shows the tight equivalence between the DL assumption and the CDH assumption. The crucial benefit of the direct reduction is that we can easily extend the approach to variants of the CDH assumption, e.g., the bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption. Indeed, we show several tight computational equivalences and discuss applicabilities of our techniques
Algebraic Approaches for the Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem over Prime Fields
The elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem is one of the most important problems in cryptography. In recent years, several index calculus algorithms have been introduced for elliptic curves defined over extension fields, but the most important curves in practice, defined over prime fields, have so far appeared immune to these attacks. In this paper we formally generalize previous attacks from binary curves to prime curves. We study the efficiency of our algorithms with computer experiments and we discuss their current and potential impact on elliptic curve standards. Our algorithms are only practical for small parameters at the moment and their asymptotic analysis is limited by our understanding of Gröbner basis algorithms. Nevertheless, they highlight a potential vulnerability on prime curves which our community needs to explore further.SCOPUS: cp.kinfo:eu-repo/semantics/published19th IACR International Conference on Practice and Theory in Public-Key Cryptography, PKC 2016; Taipei; Taiwan; 6 March 2016 through 9 March 2016ISBN: 978-366249386-1Volume Editors: Cheng C.-M.Chung K.-M.Yang B.-Y.Persiano G.Publisher: Springer Verla